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The existence of Non-tradable Shares used to be a critical obstacle in the 
development of China’s capital market. State-owned Stock Reduction and 
Non-tradable Share Reform are both reforms aimed at solving this problem, which 
have led to quite different results. On the basis of previous studies on this issue, the 
author first makes hypothesis that participants of the games are limited rational, then 
sets State-owned Stock Reduction and Non-tradable Share Reform into a unified 
analysis framework, using an evolutionary game model, to reveal the reason why the 
two reforms led to different results and the dynamic evolution process between them.  
Firstly, after analyzing the limited rationality of the Government and Investor, 
the paper proposes that the existence of Non-tradable Shares induced by the limited 
rationality of Government transmitted a latent guarantee signature to investors, 
which caused the policy-dependent bias of investors. 
Secondly, the paper uses the Two-section Reliance Model to analyze the 
evolutionary games of State-owned Stock Reduction and Non-tradable Share Reform. 
In the State-owned Stock Reduction stage, the releasing of latent guarantee signature 
shake the existing investing notion of investors, at the same time, the government 
lacked the stability to push on the reform, thus forming a double unreliability in 
investors. Therefore the Reliance Coefficient in the model is very low. Moreover, 
previous game frequency is very low under such totally new game backgrounds. All 
these factors result in the (Non-trust, Non-trust) Evolutionarily Stable Strategy, 
demonstrating the failure of State-owned Stock Reduction. 
In contrast, in the Non-tradable Share Reform stage, the government 
transmitted a reliable promise signature to investors through its determination and 
repositioning in the market, as well as full consideration of investors’ interests. Such 
signature is key to the improvement of the Reliance Coefficient in the model, also 
promoting the government to increase its Reliance Input. Therefore, the game 















Non-tradable Share Reform. 
Finally, the paper generalizes the dynamic game process from an institutional 
perspective, proposing that the institutional change from Non-tradable Shares to Full 
circulation is, in fact, a changeover from one equilibrium to another equilibrium via 
repeated games. To investors, this process has seen the collapse and rebuilding of 
their investing concept, as well as the lost and recovering of their belief to the capital 
market. To the government, it is a process in which it has been adjusting its 
responsibility in the capital market and improving its administration method. In this 
process, rational value-investing concept is gradually accepted, bringing about a 
prospective change of the pricing mechanism and operating manner of the capital 
market.  
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第一章  绪  论 














有股减持四个月后，2001 年 10 月 22 日，沪深股指分别跌至 1514 点和 3124 点，




到 2001 年底和 2002 年初，股市又一次开始下跌，沪市 2002 年 1 月 22 日跌至
1358 点的低点，深成指 2002 年 1 月 21 日跌至 2682 点的低点。暂停国有股减



















2005 年 4 月 29 日，证监会发布《关于上市公司股权分置改革试点有关问
题的通知》，确立了“市场稳定发展，规则公平统一，方案协商选择，流通股股
东表决，实施分步有序”的操作原则，股权分置改革正式破冰。随着股权分置
改革的顺利推进，资本市场的面貌焕然一新：从 2005 年 4 月 29 日到 2006 年
12 月 31 日，上证指数从 1159 点上涨到 2675 点，Ａ股总市值也由 2005 年末的
2.3 万亿元上涨到 8.9 万亿元，相当于 2005 年底的 4 倍，2007 年开市就迎来市
场的大涨。统计数据显示，2006 年以来至 2007 年 5 月，新成立的基金总规模
超过 3800 亿元，相当于前 8 年扩张的总和，而 58 家基金公司管理的资产规模
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